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Abstract
Part I of this Note will discuss the concepts of sovereignty, state responsibility for injuries to
aliens, and compensation for expropriation under international law. Part II will examine United
States policy on expropriations and explore how United States citizens may seek redress for for-
eign property loss in United States courts. Part III will argue that, under an international legal
analysis, the United States would be liable in cases such as Ramirez and Langenegger, and will
propose a standard for determining when the United States should compensate its citizens for
foreign property loss. Next, this Note will conclude that the United States should assume respon-
sibility for foreign property loss by its citizens when its activities in the foreign territory directly
or indirectly caused the loss. Finally, this Note will conclude that the United States should assume
responsibility for foreign property loss by its citizens when its activities in the foreign territory
directly or indirectly cause the loss.
UNITED STATES LIABILITY FOR EXPROPRIATIONS IN
FOREIGN TERRITORY: SETTING THE
STANDARD FOR RESPONSIBILITY
INTRODUCTION
The United States Government has the right to take prop-
erty belonging to its citizens, both in domestic and foreign ter-
ritory,1 providing that adequate compensation is given.2 When
the property is located in foreign territory, however, it is diffi-
cult to determine whether responsibility for the taking should
be placed on the United States or the territorial sovereign.'
In two recent cases, Ramirez v. Weinberger4 and Langenegger
v. United States,5 citizens of the United States sued their govern-
ment for losses resulting from the expropriation of their prop-
erty in foreign territory. The United States claimed in both
instances that the territorial sovereign was responsible for the
taking and, therefore, the act of state doctrine6 barred judicial
1. See Hanson Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581, 587 (1923) ("the power of
eminent domain is not dependent upon any specific grant; it is an attribute of sover-
eignty, limited and conditioned by the just compensation clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment"); see also Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601, 603 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Turney
v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 464 (Ct. Cl. 1953); Gray v. United States, 21 Ct.
Cl. 340 (1886).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960) (just compensation clause of fifth amendment was "designed to bar Govern-
ment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole"); Berger, A Policy Analysis of the
Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165 (1974); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165
(1967).
3. See, e.g., Aris Gloves v. United States, 420 F.2d 1386 (Ct. CI. 1970); Best v.
United States, 292 F.2d 274 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Anglo Chinese Shipping Co. v. United
States, 127 F. Supp. 553 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
4. 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated sub nom. Weinberger v. Ramirez, 105
S. Ct. 2353 (1985), on remand 788 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
5. 756 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 78 (1985).
6. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The classic
statement of the act of state doctrine was made in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S.
250, 252 (1897):
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Re-
dress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the
means open to be availed of by the sovereign powers as between them-
selves.
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review of the cases.7 Although the courts employed different
rationales, both rejected this argument. However, although
the courts recognized that the United States is liable to its citi-
zens for injuries resulting from its involvement in the affairs of
other nations, 9 the claimants were ultimately denied relief."
Determining which state is responsible for an expropria-
tion of property in a peace-time context is a relatively new
question."' It is impossible to adequately address the issue in
the vacuum of domestic law. At present, there is no consensus
on whether international law imposes a duty on states to com-
pensate aliens for the expropriation of their property. 12 More-
over, current views of state responsibility law hold that foreign
coercion or intervention will exculpate a state of liability for
7. See Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1569; Ramirez, 745 F.2d at 1533.
8. Compare Ramirez, 745 F.2d at 1539 (Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C.
2370(e) (1982) created exception to the act of state doctrine when expropriation by
foreign state violated international law) with Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1569 (act of
state doctrine not a bar to judicial review because court could determine level of
United States involvement in the taking without scrutinizing the motives of the terri-
torial sovereign). See also infra notes 102-117 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the act of state doctrine and the Hickenlooper Amendment.
9. See Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1570; Ramirez, 745 F.2d at 1530.
10. The Ramirez case was mooted by a special Congressional bill which called on
the Honduran Government to compensate the United States citizen whose property
was taken. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1894, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. Oct. 12, 1984;
105 S. Ct. 2353 (vacating the D.C. Circuit's opinion). The Langenegger court held that
United States involvement was not substantial enough to trigger fifth amendment
liability, and referred the plaintiff to international arbitration. 756 F.2d at 1573.
11. Most United States cases dealing with this issue arose in post-World War II
Germany and Japan, involving claims of property loss for which the United States
shared responsibility with other allied occupying states. See, e.g., Aris Gloves v.
United States, 420 F.2d 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Best v. United States, 292 F.2d 274 (Ct.
Cl. 1961); Anglo Chinese Shipping Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 553 (1955); see
also infra note 54.
12. The view long held by the United States and most Western nations is that
states must provide prompt, adequate and effective compensation to aliens whose
property is expropriated. This standard was first articulated by Secretary of State
Cordell Hull in his letter to Mexico regarding the latter's large-scale nationalization
of property in the 1930s. See 5 U.S. Dept. State, For. Rel. of U.S., Diplomatic Papers
1938, 685 (1956); see also I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 533
(3d' ed. 1979) [hereinafter I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES]; Clagett, The Expropriation Issue
Before the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal: Is 'Just Compensation" Required by International Law or
Not?, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 813 (1984). Many less developed countries have
taken an extremist view that sovereign states have sole discretion to determine when
to take property and how much, if any, compensation will be provided. See, e.g.,
Arechaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign Owned Property, 11 N.Y.U.J.
INT'L L. & POL. 179, 183 (1978).
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resulting injury to aliens. 3 Thus, even if the United States as-
serts, in cases such as Ramirez and Langenegger, that the territo-
rial sovereign is responsible for an expropriation, the injured
individual will likely receive no remedy under prevailing views
of international law.' 4
Part I of this Note will discuss the concepts of sover-
eignty, 5 state responsibility for injuries to aliens,' 6 and com-
pensation for expropriation under international law.' 7 Part II
will examine United States policy on expropriations and ex-
plore how United States citizens may seek redress for foreign
property loss in United States courts.'" Part II will then ana-
lyze the Ramirez and Langenegger decisions in light of the con-
flicting international and domestic approaches to expropria-
tion cases.' 9 Part III will argue that, under an international
legal analysis, the United States would be liable in cases such
as Ramirez and Langenegger, and will propose a standard for de-
termining when the United States should compensate its citi-
zens for foreign property lOSS. 20 Finally, this Note will con-
clude that the United States should assume responsibility for
foreign property loss by its citizens when its activities in the
foreign territory directly or indirectly cause the loss.2 1
I. STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EXPROPRIATIONS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LA W
The subject of international law, that is, the entity to
13. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 43-64 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 65-92 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 93-141 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 146-187 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 189-231 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 232-238 and accompanying text.
22. The principal sources of international law are treaties, custom, and general
principles of law. C.F. AMERASINGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS
27 (1967). Judicial decisions, scholarly works and United Nations resolutions are
evidence of what the international community regards as tenets of international law.
Id.
Customary international law has been described as "the lowest common factor
of principles of municipal law as these have been developed within the Western
world's major legal system." Oliver, Legal Remedies and Sanctions, in R. LILLICH, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 61, 66 (1983) [here-
inafter R. LILLICH, SRIA].
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which legal rights and duties apply, is the sovereign state.23
The concept of state sovereignty24 is the central component of
state responsibility law 25 and expropriation law. 26 Under an
international legal analysis, these principles will govern the de-
termination of whether, in cases such as Langenegger27 and Ra-
mirez, 2 8 a state has breached international law and whether it is
liable for injuries suffered by foreign nationals within its terri-
tory.
A. The Sovereignty and Equality of Nations
The concept of state sovereignty affords nations the right
to control their own affairs and shape their own destinies, free
from external interference. 29 As sovereign equals, states are
protected against intervention by other states.3 0 Acts of inter-
23. See P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 15 (1968) [hereinafter P. JESSuP,
LAW OF NATIONS]; L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 13, at 19 (H.
Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955); Jessup, Responsibility of States for Injuries to Individuals, 46
COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907-08 (1946) [hereinafter Jessup, Responsibility of States].
24. See infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of state sover-
eignty.
25. See infra notes 43-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interna-
tional law of state responsibility.
26. See infra notes 65-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interna-
tional law of expropriations.
27. Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 78 (1985). See infra notes 169-185 and accompanying text for a discussion
of this case.
28. Ramirez v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated sub nom.
Weinberger v. Ramirez, 105 S. Ct. 2353 (1985), on remand 788 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir.
1986). See infra notes 146-168 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
29. See W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 264
(1964); P. JESSUP, LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 23, at 12-13, 40-41. As conceived by
early Anglo-American jurists, sovereign states were "those states which exercise
supreme authority over all persons and property within their boundaries and are
completely independent of all control from without." W. WILLOUGHBY & C. FEN-
WICK, TYPES OF RESTRICTED SOVEREIGNTY AND OF COLONIAL AUTONOMY (1919). The
concept remains essentially the same in modern practice. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER, art.
2 (1), (7) (recognizing the "principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members"
and pledging not to "intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any State .... ).
30. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Re-
lations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 39, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970) [hereinafter Res. 2625], in which the United Nations defined the principle of
sovereign equality as follows:
"(a) States are juridicially equal;
"(b) Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty;
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vention in the affairs of sovereign states are considered a
breach of international law.'
Under the principle of territorial sovereignty, a state has
unlimited jurisdiction over all matters within its territory. 2
Domestic matters are exclusively within the competence of
sovereign states, and are beyond the reach of international law
and other states. However, exercises of sovereign power
that affect other states or their nationals are within the scope of
international law, and the state must comply with the duties
prescribed by that law.3 4 As international law is consensual, if
the state does not regard the duty in question as a binding
legal tenet, or simply chooses to violate it, there is no enforce-
ment mechanism. 5
""(c) Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other States;
"(d) The territorial integrity and political independence of the State are in-
violable;
"(e) Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, so-
cial, economic and cultural systems;
"(f) Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its inter-
national obligations and to live in peace with other States."
This modern formulation is an outgrowth of the traditional concept of sover-
eignty, premised on the inherent dignity of states and the right of smaller states to
participate in international affairs on an equal footing with larger ones. See W. FRIED-
MANN, supra note 29, at 33; P. JESSUP, LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 23, at 31; R. KLEIN,
SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AMONG STATES: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 144 (1974).
31. See G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 76 (6th ed.
1976) ("[t]he mutual recognition of one another's sovereignty means that in the ab-
sence of permissive rules of international law to the contrary, States accept a legal
duty not to trespass on the territorial jurisdiction of other sovereign States"); see also
the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A.
Res. 3201, (S-VI), GAOR Sixth Spec. Sess., Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974) [hereinafter Res. 3201], which called for "full respect for the following princi-
ples: Sovereign equality of States, self-determination of all peoples, inadmissibility
of the acquisition of territories by force, territorial integrity and non-interference in
the internal affairs of other States."
32. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 31, at 76.
33. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 291. The privileges of sover-
eignty include the state's right to apply its laws within its territory, to freely choose its
political and economic systems, and to exploit its natural resources. See Res. 2625,
supra note 30; M.S. RAJAN, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES (1978).
34. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 292. Economic boycotts and ex-
propriation decrees affecting the property of aliens are clear examples. d.
35. See L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 23, § 11-12, at 15-19. Since consent is the basis
of international law, states must first recognize that a principle of law is in fact bind-
ing upon them before they will accede to the obligations imposed. Id.; see also W.
FRIEDMANN, supra note 29, at 85 ("The obedience to [international] law does not nec-
essarily rest upon either command or the threat of sanction but on the acceptance of
a norm as binding.").
1986] LIABILITY FOR EXPROPRIATIONS 27
A state may agree to limitations on its sovereignty, such as
granting territorial privileges to other states by treaty or cus-
tom. 3 6 Thus, a state may be allowed to perform governmental
functions within the territorial domain of another sovereign
state, with concurrent jurisdiction. 37 However, if a state en-
croaches on an area within the exclusive jurisdiction of another
state without permission, it is guilty of unlawful intervention.38
Although a nation may be sovereign and equal with other
states in theory,39 it may be economically or otherwise depen-
dent on other states in reality.4 ° The discrepancy between re-
36. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 292; G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra
note 31, at 76.
37. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 292; G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra
note 31, at 76. A prime example is the stationing of foreign armed forces on a mili-
tary base in another state. The sending state may exercise jurisdiction over the acts
of its nationals on the base while at the same time the "receiving state may punish
any breaches of its own law." I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 364, 370-71;
see also G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 31, at 82.
38. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 31, at 52; see also I. BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF
THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY (PART I) 187-88 (1983) [hereinafter I.
BROWNLIE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY]. The duty of nonintervention in the affairs of sov-
ereign nations is an established corollary to the principle of sovereignty. I. BROWN-
LIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 291. It is expounded in the Charter and declara-
tions of the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and in stated poli-
cies of individual nations. See, e.g., Res. 2625, supra note 31: "No State or group of
States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and
all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the
State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of inter-
national law." The OAS Charter contains almost identical language in Art. 18. See
2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361 (1952); see also U.N. CHARTER art. 2 para. 4.
39. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2 para. 1 (recognizing the sovereign equality of all
states). Once the minimum requirements of statehood are fulfilled, see I. BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 74 (consisting of a permanent population, defined terri-
tory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states), a state
is accorded equal status with other states in the international community, regardless
of size, wealth, political system or duration of existence. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note
29, at 32.
40. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 76. The existence of "prima
facie evidence of statehood," that is, a government, legal system, separate nationality
and the conduct of foreign relations, is not determinative of the degree to which
foreign control dominates the nation. Id. There may also be consensual arrange-
ments between states whereby certain powers are delegated to a foreign sovereign
while the state retains its international status as a state. Hannum and Lillich, The
Concept of Antonomy in International Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 858, 859, 888 (1980). These
so-called "associated states" may maintain unlimited control over their internal af-
fairs while abdicating control over, typically, foreign affairs and national defense. d.
at 888; see also I. BROWNLIE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, snpra note 38, at 187-88.
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ality and theory4' has made it difficult to enforce the principle
of non-intervention, or indeed, to determine whether imper-
missible intervention has occurred.
42
B. The Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens
While the standard by which a state treats its own citizens
is a domestic matter,43 a state's treatment of foreign nationals
within its jurisdiction falls within the scope of international
law.4 4 The rules and norms governing this area constitute the
international law of state responsibility for injuries to aliens.45
State responsibility law protects the rights of individuals
who are within the territory of a foreign sovereign. 46 Tradi-
tionally, those who are injured by foreign states must rely on
41. This discrepancy owes in large part to the anachronism of national sover-
eignty as applied to the modern international scene. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 29, at
35. Professor Friedmann notes that, "contrary to the predominant trend in previous
centuries, the emergence of national states often means today not the integration of
smaller units in a common political and legal authority, but the disintegration of
larger units into a number of smaller, and often barely viable, political entities." Id.
at 31.
With little or no industrial development, limited natural resources, and no expe-
rience in self-government, combined with the political tension of East-West relations,
small nations are ill-described as sovereign equals with large ones. See R. KLEIN, Supra
note 30, at 167 ("In sum, no mythical concept of sovereign equality can charm away
the brutal character of group behaviour, the wide variations of power existing among
nation-states, and the reality that it is to the facts of power that they invariably make
responses .. ").
42. An exact definition of "intervention" is elusive and would seem to depend
on the circumstances in any given case. See Joyner & Grimaldi, The United States and
Nicaragua: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention, 25 VA. J. INT'L L.
621 (1985). At one extreme, intervention has been defined as "dictatorial interfer-
ence by a State in the affairs of another State for the purpose of maintaining or alter-
ing the actual condition of things." L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 23, § 134 at 305 . A
more moderate view would distinguish between "agency and control" and "ad hoc
interference and 'advice.' " I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 77.
43. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; Joyner, supra note 42, at 653. One
exception to this rule is human rights violations, e.g., genocide perpetrated on the
sovereign's own citizenry, which is a violation of international law. Id.
44. See Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of
Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 545 (1961) ("International law has developed over the
last two hundred years standards and procedures designed to protect the life, liberty,
and economic security of nationals of one State who live or conduct business activi-
ties in another State.").
45. Id.; see also C.F. AMERASINGHE, supra note 22; I. BROWNI.IE, PRINCIPLES, supra
note 12; Jessup, Responsibility of States, supra note 23; Lillich, The Current Status of the
Law, in R. LILLICH, SRIA, supra note 22, at 3.
46. C.F. AMERASINGHE, supra note 22, at 4.
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their own sovereign to assert their claim.47 The claim ceases to
be their own and becomes the claim of their state.48 The right
of a state to protect its nationals abroad is a long-standing
principle of international law, although less-developed nations
have often criticized its practice as an abuse of diplomatic pro-
tection.49
In 1954, the International Law Commission (ILC) con-
vened to codify the law of state responsibility.50 To date, the
47. Jessup, Responsibility of States, supra note 23, at 907-08; Ohly, A Functional
Analysis of Claimant Eligibility, in R. LILLICH, SRIA, supra note 22, at 282-83 ("to secure
appropriate remedies for their greivances, individuals must find protection of their
human rights and compensation for their injuries through resort to. . . the States to
which those individuals owe their allegiance.").
48. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 518-19;Jessup, Responsibility of
States, supra note 23, at 907-08.
49. See generally E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD
(1915); R. LILLICH, SRIA,-supra note 22, at 4-5.
In the nineteenth century, major European nations sought to secure the interests
of their nationals abroad through the exercise of diplomatic protection. C.F. AMER-
ASINGHE, supra note 22, at 2;Jessup, Responsibility of States, supra note 23, at 906. Euro-
pean nations maintained there was an "international minimum standard" in the
treatment of aliens. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 524-28; R. LILLICH,
SRIA, supra note 22, at 10-15. If a state failed to live up to this standard, it breached
its duty under international law, and was responsible to the State whose citizen was
injured. Id. At the same time, Latin American states, which felt that diplomatic pro-
tection was merely a facade for intervention, formulated the Calvo Doctrine, which
rebuked the international standard of treatment of aliens in favor of a national stan-
dard of treatment. Jessup, Responsibility of States, supra note 23, at 910; see also Garcia-
Amador, The Proposed NIEO: A New Approach to the Law Governing Nationalization and
Compensation, 12 LAw. AM. 1, 18 (1980). Under the Calvo Doctrine, as long as aliens
were treated the same as nationals of the state, the duties imposed by international
law were fulfilled. Id. Although the Calvo Doctrine was never widely adopted
outside Latin America, it has greatly influenced the development of international law
in recent years. The NIEO, for example, provides that expropriations of alien prop-
erty should be compensated by the national standard, and states need not comply
with any international norm. Id. at 25; Arechaga, supra note 12, at 186.
50. See United Nations Office of Public Information, THE WORK OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw COMMISSION 83 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter THE WORK OF THE ILC]. The
ILC was created by the United Nations in 1947 for the progressive development and
codification of international law. See generally C.F. AMERASINGHE, supra note 22, at 31-
32; I. BROWNLIE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra, note 38, at 13-14;Jagota, The Role of the
International Law Commission in the Development of International Law, 16 INDIAN J. INT'L L.
459 (1976). The ILC is composed of legal experts from member nations, represent-
ing the full range of views in the world community. The ILC's work is the most
definitive expression available for current views on the international law of state re-
sponsibility. Such views are, however, heavily influenced by states that are relative
newcomers to the international scene, and which have voiced considerable opposi-
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ILC has issued only draft articles on state responsibility law.5'
However, as these articles are the most representative and au-
thoritative expression of the international community's views
on state responsibility, they are an important reference for de-
termining the present status of the law.52
For a state to be liable under the international law of state
responsibility, there must be an act or omission that breaches
an obligation established by international law, is imputable to
the state, and causes injury to the alien.5"
The mere occurrence of an injury within a state's territory
is not sufficient to impose liability on that state.54 The unlaw-
tion to standards of international law established before they achieved their indepen-
dence. Id.
When the ILC was formed, the subject of state responsibility was given top pri-
ority as a matter for codification. See THE WORK OF THE ILC, supra; [1975] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N at 51-56. A primary reason for this decision was the dissatisfaction
with existing principles of international law, especially regarding property rights. R.
LILLICH, SRIA, supra note 22, at 14. This topic had become increasingly politicized
and the less developed nations believed that the rules of state responsibility were
contrary to their interests because they protected the property of citizens of capital-
exporting nations and placed the whole burden of compensation on the weaker state.
See Guha-Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal
International Law? 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 863 (1961).
51. By 1978, the ILC adopted only Part One of the Draft Articles on State Re-
sponsibility, and submitted it to member nations for comments. See Draft Articles on
State Responsibility Law, [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (Part One). [hereinafter ILC
Draft Articles] The United Nations General Assembly has expressed its support of
the ILC's work, but endorsement of the codification will not come until final comple-
tion. See [1983] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N.
52. See I. BROWNLIE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 38, at 10-18. In the Iran
Hostages Case, the United States invoked the attribution principles of Article 8 of the
ILC's Draft Articles on State Responsibility to support its contention that the govern-
ment of Iran was responsibile for the conduct of the students at the American Em-
bassy in Tehran. See Memorial of the Government of the United States of America at
46, Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.CJ. 3.
53. C.F. AMERASINGHE, supra note 22, at 37. A state may incur liability for a
wrongful omission if it fails to punish wrongdoers who cause injury to aliens. See
Christenson, The Doctrine of Attribution in State Responsibility, in R. LILLICH, SRIA, supra
note 22, at 339-341; see also I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 439-440; RE-
STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 207
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
54. See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 51; see also C.F. AMERASINGHE, supra note
21, at 49; I. BROWNLIE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 38, at 36-48 (discussing
Corfu Channel Case and principles of fault in determining state responsibility).
Conversely, in practice, states have sometimes assumed liability for non-state
conduct. See R. LILLICH & B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT
By LUMP-SuM AGREEMENTS, PART ONE: THE COMMENTARY 113 (1975) [hereinafter
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ful conduct must be imputable to the state by more than physi-
cal proximity.5 5 The territorial sovereign will incur interna-
tional responsibility only if the act or omission may properly be
attributed to it, taking into account the nature of the conduct,
the parties involved, and whether any defenses are available.56
The attribution of conduct57 to a state becomes problem-
atic when the parties causing injury do not act on behalf of the
state,58 when one state participates in the wrongful act of an-
other5 9 or when a state is subject to foreign control or coer-
R. LILLICH, INT'L CLAIMS]. For instance, claims against "predecessor regimes," polit-
ical subdivisions, minor officials and third states acting in the territory have occasion-
ally been settled by the current territorial sovereign. Id. at 114-36. As to third-state
activity, however, host states have assumed liability only for wartime damages caused
by their allies. Id. at 132. There are no instances in which states took responsibility
for injuries to aliens resulting from "peacetime actions taken by, or under the author-
ity of, third States." Id.
55. See Corfu Channel Case, (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. (Judgment of Apr. 9) ("it
cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a State over its
territory and waters that that state knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act
perpetrated therein . . . . This fact, by itself, and apart from other circumstances,
neither involves primafacie responsibility nor shifts the burden of proof"); see also C.F.
AMERASINGHE, supra note 22, at 49; I. BROWNLIE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note
38, at 36-48, 180-192.
56. See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 51, art. 5-15; see also id. art. 29-34, which
provide six additional defenses: consent of the wronged state, countermeasures
against an internationally wrongful act, force majeure and fortuitous event, distress,
state of necessity, and self-defense.
57. Attribution theory is used to determine when certain conduct constitutes an
act of state for "the purpose of allocating responsibility to the State for the conse-
quences of certain wrongful acts or omissions of its organs and officials." Christen-
son, supra note 53 at 321.
58. See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 51, Art. 11 (e.g. foreign officials and pri-
vate individuals).
Attribution doctrine is generally used to distinguish between state acts and pri-
vate acts. Christenson, supra note 53, at 326. Likened to the principle of "state ac-
tion" under United States constitutional law, attribution doctrine focuses on
"whether the State has an independent obligation to prevent harm or to act affirma-
tively for conscious community purposes." Id. at 341, 322. Thus, even if private
activity leads to injury, the state may incur liability if it failed to live up to its duty to
prevent the harm or punish the wrongdoer in its capacity as guardian of the public.
Id. at 324. The state cannot avoid responsibility by placing the blame on non-state
actors; it will be responsible for injuries arising from both its own actions and its
failure to control others. Id.
59. See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 51, art. 27-28. When more than one state is
involved in an activity that causes injury to an alien, causation theory is helpful in
determining whether the act of one state may relieve the territorial sovereign of lia-
bility by breaking the chain of causation. Strauss, Causation .Is An Element of State Re-
sPonsibilitV, 16 L. & POL'Y IN'L Bus. 893, 922-23 (1984). This theory also takes into
account the lawfulness of the acts committed. Thus, if the first state commits an
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cion.6 ° The ILC's draft articles provide guidelines for certain
situations, 6 but it is difficult to anticipate the variations that
may arise.
The major areas of uncertainty in applying state responsi-
bility law concern the breach of alleged obligations and the im-
putability of wrongful acts to the state.62 Not all states agree as
to what their duties are with respect to each other. When na-
tions cannot agree upon their duties under international law,
they will not agree on whether a breach has occurred, and
hence, whether a remedy must be offered. There is particu-
larly acute disagreement over the issue of compensation for
the expropriation of alien property.64
unlawful act, to which the second state lawfully responds, the second state will not be
liable for injuries resulting from its conduct. Id. at 924. The first state will be held
responsible because its unlawful act was the "proximate" cause of the injury. Id. The
deficiency of this approach is the same as that afflicting the whole of state responsibil-
ity law, that is, when is state conduct "unlawful" under international law? For a dis-
cussion of the dispute over the duty to compensate for expropriations, see infra notes
65-92 and accompanying text.
60. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 51, art. 28(1)-(2). Not only will the territorial
sovereign be exculpated of liability for coerced acts, or acts committed under the
control or direction of foreign governments, but responsibility will shift to the inter-
vening foreign state. Id. It is also possible for both states to incur responsibility
under these circumstances. Id. art. 28(3).
61. See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 51, which provide that the conduct of the
following may be imputed to the state for the purpose of allocating responsibility:
official state organs, such as legislative, executive, and judicial branches of govern-
ment, id. art. 5-6, even if they exceed their competence, id. art. 10; organs that are
"not part of the formal structure of the state. . .but which [are] empowered. . .to
exercise elements of the governmental authority," id. art. 7 (2); persons "acting on
behalf" of the state, id. art. 8(a), or "exercising elements of the governmental author-
ity in the absence of the official authorities," id. art. 8(b); organs "placed at the dispo-
sal of a state by another state or by an international organization," id. art. 9; insurrec-
tional movements which become the new government of the state. Id. art. 15.
In contrast, a state will not be held responsible for the acts of: persons not acting
on behalf of the state, id. art. 11; organs of another state acting for their own sover-
eign in the territory of the state, id. art. 12; organs of an international organization
acting for that organization, id. art. 13; organs of an unsuccessful insurrectional
movement. Id. art. 14.
62. CF. AMERASINGHE, supra note 22, at 49-55; Christenson, suproa note 53, at
321-22; Strauss, supra note 59, at 902-03.
63. See R. LLICH, SRIA, supra note 22, at 14-16. The ILC's draft articles on
state responsibility provide no guidance on the substantive obligations imposed by
international law; they merely set forth the legal consequences of breaches of obliga-
tions. Id.
64. Compare Arechaga, supra note 12 (states have no duty under international law
to compensate aliens for expropriated property) with Muller, Compensation for National-
ization .tA North-South Dialogue, 19 COLtJ. J. TRANSNAT'L. I. 35 (1981) (the widely-ac-
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C. The Dispute Over Compensation
The right of a sovereign state to control its resources is an
established principle of international law. 65  Accordingly, a
state may dispose of property within its jurisdiction as it sees
fit, whether the property is owned by its nationals or by nation-
als of other states.6 6 Thus, expropriations6 7 are not per se ille-
gal under international law. 68 However, if the expropriation
does not fulfill certain requirements, it will be regarded as con-
trary to international law.69 Under the "classical" standard,70
expropriations are lawful if three conditions are met: 1) the
taking was for a public purpose; 71 2) the action did not discrim-
cepted rule is that states have a duty under international law to compensate aliens for
expropriations),
65. See Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A.
Res. 1803, (XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962)
[hereinafter Res. 1803], in which the United Nations reaffirmed "the inalienable right
of all states freely to dispose of their natural wealth and resources in accordance with
their national interests." The United States takes the same position. See Hanson Co. v.
United States, 261 U.S. 581, 587 (1923); RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, § 206 (Tent.
Draft No. 2 1982).
66. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES supra note 12, at 531-33; see also Res. 1803, supra
note 65 ("Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds
or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as
overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign.").
67. Brownlie defines expropriations as "deprivation by state organs of a right of
property . . . followed by transfer to the territorial state or to third parties." I.
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 532. Where the expropriation is part of
large-scale social or economic reform, it is often referred to as "nationalization." Id.
Since nationalizations are for the most part a "species of expropriations," C.F. AMER-
ASINGHE, supra note 22, at 129, the terms will be used interchangeably here.
68. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12.
69. See Arechaga, supra note 12; Garcia-Amador, supra note 49.
70. See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text for the views of nations which
reject the traditional standard regarding expropriations.
71. R. LILLICH, INT'L CLAIMS, supra note 54, at 137-38; see also Note, International
Law of Expropriation of Foreign Owned Property: Te Compensation Requirement and the Role
of the Taking State, 6 LOYOLA INT'L & COMp. L.J. 355, 356 (1983) [hereinafter Note,
Compensation and the Taking State].
Because the decision to expropriate is an exercise of sovereign discretion, the
public purpose requirement is merely a way of ensuring that takings serve legitimate
rather than capricious ends. C.F. AMERASINGHE, supra note 22, at 135-38; R. LILLICII,
IN'r'L CI.AiMs, supra note 54, at 137-39. In the absence of clear norms as to what
objectives will justify expropriations, this requirement will rest on subjective, ad hoc
criteria. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, § 712 comment c (Tent. Draft No. 7
1986) ("Itlhe public purpose limitation has not figured prominently in international
claims practice, perhaps because the concept of public purpose is broad and not sub-
ject to effective re-examination by other states").
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inate against aliens;7 2 and 3) the state provided "prompt, ade-
quate, and effective" compensation.73
The most controversial question regarding expropriations
is whether and in what manner a state must compensate aliens
for the deprivation of their property.74 Although a majority of
states agree that some compensation should be offered, most
do not accept the classic "prompt, adequate, and effective"
standard.7 5 Less developed, economically fragile states cannot
bear the heavy burden of this standard.76 From their perspec-
tive, the form and amount of compensation should depend
upon a nation's ability to pay as well as the type of expropria-
tion. 77 Thus, if a large-scale nationalization program is imple-
mented as a measure of social reform, less stringent compensa-
tion requirements should be imposed.78 In addition, some
commentators have argued that a state need not compensate
for expropriations unless it has been unjustly enriched.79
Under this theory, a state has no duty to compensate if it does
not enjoy an increase in wealth, even though aliens have suf-
fered losses.8 °
72. See C.F. AMERASINGHE, supra note 22, at 138-42; I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES,
supra note 12, at 539; Note, Compensation and the Taking State, supra note 71. The
United States regarded the 1960 Cuban nationalization of foreign assets as illegal
under international law because it unfairly discriminated against aliens, chiefly
United States citizens. See C.F. AMERASINGHE, supra note 22, at 138-42. The illegality
of such action was the basis for disregarding the act of state doctrine and hearing
claims against Cuba in United States courts under the Hickenlooper Amendment. See
infa notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
73. Note, Compensation and the Taking State, supra note 71; I. BROWNLIE, PRINCI-
PLES, supra note 12, at 533. While in theory adhering to the "prompt, adequate and
effective standard," states have in practice settled for "partial" payments spread over
long periods of time. Id. at 544; R. LILLICH, INT'L CLAIMS, supra note 54, at 216;
Muller, supra note 64, at 46.
Installment payments are generally acceptable as long as the payment period
does not exceed ten years. Muller, supra note 64, at 47. The "effectiveness" of the
payment depends upon the currency used. R. LILLICH, INT'L CLAIMS, supra note 54,
at 240. Claimant states insist on payment in their own or some other stable currency.
Id. at 242. Government bonds may be acceptable, if they are marketable and due to
mature in the near future. Muller, supra note 64, at 47.
74. See Clagett, supra note 12; Garcia-Amador, supra note 49, at 20.
75. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 544; Arechaga, supra note 12,
at 184; Muller, supra note 64, at 37.
76. Note, Compensation and the Taking State, supra note 7 1, at 359.
77. Id.; Arechaga, supra note 12, at 184.
78. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 538; Muller, supra note 64, at 45.
79. Arechaga, supra note 12, at 182.
80. Id.
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As a majority of nations reject the "prompt, adequate, and
effective" standard, many legal scholars maintain that it is not a
viable tenet of customary international law. 8' Nevertheless,
the Western developed nations continue to support the stan-
dard.82
More troublesome is the issue of whether expropriations
are actually within the scope of international law. Until 1974,
the declarations and resolutions of the United Nations reaf-
firmed the traditional duty of states under international law to
compensate for expropriations of alien property.8 3 However,
in 1974, the United Nations adopted the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States, part of the New International Eco-
nomic Order (NIEO).14 The NIEO provides that compensa-
tion should be paid, but leaves the decision to the discretion of
the nationalizing state.8 5 Compensation for expropriations of
alien property is not a duty under the terms of the NIEO,8 6 and
any disputes regarding compensation are settled according to
81. See Id. at 184; Note, Compensation and the Taking State, supra note 71, at 359.
But cf. Clagett, supra note 12, at 74. See also supra note 35 for a discussion of the
consensual basis of international law.
82. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 533; Clagett, supra note 12; 1975
DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW at 488. The following
states voted against the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res.
3281 (XXIX) 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter Res. 3281 ], which rejected the traditional standard of compensation supported by
Western nations: Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg,
United Kingdom, United States. See 1974 U.N.Y.B. 404.
83. U.N. CHARTER; Res. 1803, supra note 65; Res. 2625, supra note 30. This was
in spite of growing opposition by less developed countries to the compensation re-
quirement, which they charged was instituted by "exploiting imperialistic powers to
promote their interests." See Jessup, Responsibility of States, supra note 23, at 419. In
essence, the argument was that capital-exporting nations formulated the compensa-
tion standard to protect the financial interests of their nationals who profitted by
tapping the resources of undeveloped colonies and weak states. Id. As these states
tried to gain more control over their resources and thereby reduce their dependence
on foreign powers, they resorted to expropriation of assets within their jurisdiction.
The compensation requirement promulgated by Western developed states stood as a
major obstacle to the achievement of these goals. See Arechaga, supra note 12, at 181
("the assertion of the existence of a duty of restitution of a nationalized undertaking
would be tantamount to a denial of the right to nationalize"); see also I. BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 537; Muller, supra note 64, at 45.
84. Res. 3281, supra note 82. Rather than an economic agenda, the NIEO is an
attempt to restructure the entire existing international order. See Garcia-Amador,
supra note 49, at 14-15.
85. Res. 3281, supra note 82; Garcia-Amador, supra note 49, at 29; Note, Compen-
sation and the Taking State, supra note 71, at 361-62.
86. Arechaga, supra note 12, at 186; Garcia-Amador, supra note 49, at 29.
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domestic rather than international law.
The NIEO has been criticized as a repudiation of interna-
tional law insofar as it takes the whole subject matter of expro-
priations outside the scope of international law and places it
within the domestic jurisdiction of the taking state.88 If the
taking state did not compensate for expropriating property, it
would not be guilty of a wrongful act under international law,89
although the sovereign of the injured alien could publicly pro-
test such action.
Thus, the current debate over expropriations centers on
both the adequacy of compensation and the applicability of in-
ternational law.9° Nations that support the NIEO emphasize
domestic discretion regarding compensation for expropria-
tions.9' Western developed nations maintain the traditional
view that expropriations are subject to international law, which
requires that a state provide prompt, adequate and effective
compensation. 92 This conflict is likely to cause disputes be-
tween states over the proper remedies for expropriations and
inconsistent results in the resolution of these situations.
II. SEEKING RELIEF FOR FOREIGN PROPERTY LOSS IN
UNITED STATES COURTS: THE DOMESTIC
PERSPECTIVE ON TAKINGS OF
PROPERTY
The United States recognizes that, as an exercise of sover-
eignty, a nation may expropriate or nationalize alien property
within its territory.9 3 However, the United States maintains
87. Garcia-Amador, supra note 49, at 41-43. This has been called a resurrection
of the Calvo Doctrine, whereby the national standard of treatment for aliens prevails.
Id.
88. See Arechaga, supra note 12, at 186.
89. Id. at 187; Note, Compensation and the Taking State, supra note 71, at 356.
90. Garcia-Amador, supra note 49, at 57; Muller, supra note 64, at 36.
91. Arechaga, supra note 12, at 181; Muller, supra note 64, at 37.
92. See supra notes 73, 82 and accompanying text; see also Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 887-93 (2d Cir. 1981) (discussing
various views on the standard of compensation for expropriations, and "reject[ing]
the position espoused by some states that property may be expropriated without an
obligation on the part of the nationalizing state to pay any compensation therefor.").
93. See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972). To
be lawful, however, expropriations must be for a public purpose, non-discriminatory
against aliens, and adequately compensated. RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, § 712
(Tent. Draft No. 7 1986).
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that "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation 9 4 must be
provided by the taking state, or else the expropriation violates
international law.95 Furthermore, under the Hickenlooper
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act,96 the United States
allows its nationals to seek redress in its courts against a for-
eign sovereign that provides inadequate or no compensation
for an expropriation of property. 7
United States citizens also have a constitutional right to
compensation from the United States government if it takes
their property.9" This right applies whether the property taken
is located in the United States or in a foreign territory. 9 When
the property is located abroad, adjudication of the claim under
domestic law may also affect the interests of the foreign sover-
eign in whose territory the property was located. 00 In such
cases, international legal principles of intervention, comity and
state responsibility inevitably come into play. In addition, the
claim may not even be resolved in a United States court be-
cause of justiciability doctrines that prevent adjudication of
94. This phrase was coined by Secretary of State Cordell Hull in his protest let-
ter to Mexico concerning compensation for the nationalization of United States citi-
zens' property in the 1930's. See supra note 12; RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, § 712
reporter's note 1 (Tent. Draft No. 7 1986); see also 1975 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 489, in which the State Department reaffirmed the
Hull Doctrine standard.
95. RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, § 712 (Tent. Draft No. 7 1986); see also Hick-
enlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1), which
states that international law requires "speedy compensation . . . in convertible for-
eign exchange, equivalent to the full value of" expropriated property.
96. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(l)-(2) (1982). This section is named after Senator Hick-
enlooper, who proposed the amendment. It is also sometimes called the Sabbatino
Amendment, referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), which was overruled by the Amendment. See Chase
Manhattan, 658 F.2d at 882 n.10.
97. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982), which provides that the act of state doc-
trine will not bar judicial review in United States courts of claims against foreign
sovereigns for uncompensated expropriations of United States citizens' property.
98. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
CONSTITUTION 1-3 (1977); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 463-65 (1978).
99. See Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 464-65 (Ct. Cl. 1953); L.
HENKIN, supra note 93; RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, § 721(a) ("any exercise of au-
thority by the United States in the conduct of foreign relations is subject to the Bill of
Rights and other constitutional restraints protecting individual rights.").
100. See generally, Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 78 (1985); Ramirez v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 vacated sub nora.
Weinberger v. Ramirez, 105 S. Ct. 2353 (1985), on remand 788 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
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sensitive political and foreign policy matters."'
A. Suing the Foreign Sovereign: The Act of State Doctrine and the
Hickenlooper Amendment
Traditionally, United States courts will not exercise juris-
diction in suits brought by United States citizens against for-
eign sovereign nations. 12 This justiciability rule, known as the
act of state doctrine,' °3 is based on principles of international
comity, the respect for the rights accorded all sovereign na-
tions. 104
In 1964, in reaction to the Cuban nationalization of alien
property, the United States Congress enacted the Hick-
enlooper Amendment ° 5 to the Foreign Assistance Act,'"
which created an exception to the act of state doctrine. Under
the Hickenlooper Amendment, United States courts may adju-
dicate claims against foreign governments that expropriated
United States citizens' property in violation of international
law."°7 The Amendment provides that states that expropriate
property are obligated under international law to provide
''speedy compensation for such property in convertible foreign
exchange, equivalent to the full value" of the property.8
Thus, the United States standard of compensation for expro-
priations by foreign states is essentially identical to the stan-
dard for domestic takings under the fifth amendment to the
101. See infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
102. See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964);
Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REX'. 805
(1964). This did not deprive individuals with claims against other countries. The
traditional avenue of diplomatic protection was always available, although that proce-
dure left to government discretion whether or not to assert the individual's claim. See
Jessup, Responsibility of States, supra note 23, at 908 (the State Department often de-
clines to bring claims of United States citizens against other nations, "due, not to the
demerits of the claims, but to some overriding policy of fostering friendly rela-
tions.").
103. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 416; Note, Rehabilitation and Exoneration of the Act of
State Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL 599 (1980).
104. Id. It is sometimes said that one of the privileges of state sovereignty is the
right to immunity from thejurisdiction of foreign courts. See Trindade, DomesticJuris-
diction and Exhaustion of Local Remedies: A Comparative Analysis, 16 INDIANJ. INT'L L. 187
(1976).
105. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(l)-(2) (1982).
106. Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. ch. 32 §§ 2151-2443 (1982).
107. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982).
108. Id. § 2370(e)(1).
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Constitution. 0 Even if the expropriating state adheres to a
different standard of compensation for expropriations, it will
be subject to suit in United States courts if it does not meet the
United States standard.
The Hickenlooper Amendment also requires the Presi-
dent to suspend aid to nations that have unlawfully national-
ized, expropriated, or seized control of United States citizens'
property."0 If national security interests required otherwise,
however, the President may waive this provision.'"
Most cases that have relied on the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment's exception to the act of state doctrine involved proceeds
within United States jurisdiction that were traceable to prop-
erty expropriated abroad." 12 If the foreign state tried to mar-
ket the proceeds of expropriated property in the United States,
the proceeds could be attached as a basis ofjurisdiction, and a
court could adjudicate the claim notwithstanding the act of
state doctrine.' 13 Likewise, if property within United States ju-
risdiction were the target of expropriation by a foreign state,
the dispute could also be heard by United States courts under
the Hickenlooper Amendment.' "'
In Ramirez v. United States, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit invoked the Hick-
109. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, § 712 comments c-d (Tent. Draft No. 7
1986).
110. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1)(c) (1982).
111. Id.; see also Ramirez v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1550 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
112. See e.g., Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322
(5th Cir. 1982) (Hickenlooper Amendment does not apply to case when the expro-
priated property or its proceeds are not subsequently located in the United States at
the time of suit), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First
Nat'l City Bank, 431 F.2d 394, 402 (2d Cir. 1970) (Hickenlooper Amendment only
applies when the expropriated property is being marketed in the United States), va-
cated on other grounds sub nom. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 400
U.S. 1019 (1971); United Mexican States v. Ashley, 556 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1977)
(Hickenlooper Amendment not applicable where neither expropriated property nor
its proceeds are in the United States).
The legislative history of the Amendment indicates that its purpose was to "dis-
courage foreign expropriations by making sure that the United States cannot become
a 'thieves market' for the product of foreign expropriations." See 110 Cong. Rec.
19555, 19559 (1964). In addition, foreign investment would be promoted because
individuals would be guaranteed their "day in court" in case of conflicts with foreign
sovereigns. Id.; see also Chase Manhattan, 658 F.2d at 882 n. 10.
113. See, e.g., First Natl1, 431 F.2d at 400.
114. Id. See also Compania de Gas, 686 F.2d at 327.
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enlooper Amendment to hear a case involving property expro-
priated in and still remaining in the foreign jurisdiction." 5
This was the first time a court had used the Amendment as a
basis for disregarding the act of state doctrine when there were
no proceeds of expropriated property in United States jurisdic-
tion.' 16 The Ramirez decision created a split in the federal cir-
cuit courts that remains unresolved since the United States
Supreme Court vacated the decision on other grounds, with-
out considering the merits of the case.'' 7
B. Suing the United States for Foreign Property Loss: Fifth
Amendment Liability
The United States Constitution provides that private
property shall not "be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation.""" This guarantee applies to government action
both in the United States and abroad." 9 Thus, a United States
citizen whose rights are violated by the United States Govern-
ment while he is in a foreign territory has a cause of action
under domestic law.' 20 The same analysis used in domestic
takings of property applies to foreign takings by the United
States. 121
In domestic eminent domain cases, judicial review of gov-
ernment action is limited to determining whether a true public
purpose justified the taking and whether the means used, that
is, the taking of the particular property, was a reasonable way
115. Ramirez, 745 F.2d at 1541 n.180.
116. See supra note 112.
117. See infra note 168.
118. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also supra note 98.
119. See supra note 99.
120. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-14 (1957); RESTATEMENT, supra note 53,
§ 721, comment g.
121. Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457 (Ct. Cl. 1953). Under United
States law, a government taking of private property is lawful if three conditions are
met: the taking is for a legitimate public purpose, the means used are rational, and
compensation is paid. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241-43 (1984);
see also A. ACKERMAN, supra note 98. The legislature has broad discretion to determine
when a taking will serve a public purpose, see Hawaii Housing, 467 U.S. at 239-44, and
the property taken need not be put to use for the general public in order to fulfill the
public use requirement. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Re-
gional Rail Reorg. Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974). Indeed, even if the government does
not take a possessory interest in the property, but transfers it to other parties, the
action is lawful if a legitimate public purpose is thereby served. Hawaii Housing, 467
U.S. at 243-44.
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of achieving the end goal.' -2 2 When the United States takes
property from its citizens in a foreign jurisdiction, valid claims
for compensation under the fifth amendment may be ham-
pered by prudential considerations that preclude justiciability.
The political question doctrine, for example, requires judicial
deference to executive discretion in political matters. 23 For-
eign policy, in particular, is rarely regarded as a proper subject
for judicial review. 24 The Executive's treaty-making power is
therefore exempt from judicial review, even if treaty agree-
ments affect individual citizens' property interests. 25  Simi-
larly, if United States involvement in the foreign territory is
covert, or if relations with a foreign sovereign are politically
sensitive, a court may decline to consider the merits of the
case.
126
Determining the United States' role in a foreign taking
may require an examination of the activities of the territorial
sovereign, which is generally prohibited by the act of state doc-
trine. 2 7 Courts have held that the doctrine may be waived
under the Hickenlooper Amendment in cases in which pro-
ceeds of expropriated property are in the United States. 28
However, the courts are split on whether the Amendment per-
mits review of foreign acts of state when the expropriated
122. Hawaii Housing, 467 U.S. at 242-43; National Bd. of YMCA v. United States,
395 U.S. 85 (1969).
123. The most definitive explanation of this doctrine was set forth in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 196-98 (1962). The underlying premise is that " 'political ques-
tions' . . . concern matters as to which departments of government other than the
courts, or perhaps the electorate as a whole, must have the final say." L. TRIBE, supra
note 98, at 72; see also Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine? 85 YALE LJ. 597
(1976).
124. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F.
Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356-57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1251 (1984). But see Ramirez v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1515 (D.C. Cir.
1984) ("The Executive's power to conduct foreign relations free from the unwar-
ranted supervision of the Judiciary cannot give the Executive carte blanche to trample
the most fundamental liberty and property rights of this country's citizenry."), vacated
on other grounds sub nom. Weinberger v. Ramirez, 105 S. Ct. 2353 (1985), on remand 788
F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
125. Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 237 (1983), aft'd, 765 F.2d
159 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 279 (1985); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 53,
§ 721.
126. See Flynn v. Schultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1192 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 94 (1985).
127. See supra note 102-104 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 112-114 and accompanying text.
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property remains in the foreign situs. I"9 If the act of state doc-
trine is not waived, United States courts will not exercise juris-
diction over the claim.
In addition to justiciability barriers, United States courts
have held that exigencies of war may exculpate the United
States of liability to its citizens for loss of property abroad,
even when there was clear involvement in the taking.'" ° For
example, United States courts have held that the United States
was not liable for property loss resulting from the directives of
Allied Occupation Forces in post-World War II Germany and
Japan, although the United States participated in the decision
and policy-making that prompted the takings.' 3 ' In those
cases, the territorial sovereign bore responsibility for paying
the costs of post-war rehabilitation, including compensation to
individuals deprived of their property.'3 2 The courts also
stressed that the takings primarily benefitted the territorial
sovereign and not the United States.133
In the post-World War II cases, a crucial factor was that
the United States never took possession of the property lo-
cated in the foreign jurisdiction." 4 The importance of this as-
pect of fifth amendment liability has been significantly dimin-
ished in recent cases in which the "public use" requirement
was held to include situations in which the government never
actually took possession. 35 This change in the constitutional
analysis of government liability is especially relevant to claims
regarding loss of foreign property. The broadened classifica-
tion of takings increases the types of activities that may lead to
liability, including situations where it is harder for the United
States to actually take possession of property. Accordingly, re-
cent foreign takings cases have held that a compensable taking
exists when government action deprives an owner of the use of
his property, or "makes it possible for someone else to obtain
129. See Ramirez v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1573 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated
sub nom. Weinberger v. Ramirez, 105 S. Ct. 2353 (1985), on remand 788 F.2d 143 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).
130. See Best v. United States, 292 F.2d 274, 279 (Ct. CI. 1961); Anglo Chinese
Shipping Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 553, 556-57 (Ct. CI. 1955).
131. See Best, 292 F.2d at 276-79; Anglo Chinese Shipping, 127 F. Supp. at 556-57.
132. See Best, 292 F.2d at 279; Anglo Chinese Shipping, 127 F. Supp. at 556-57.
133. See Anglo Chinese Shipping, 127 F. Supp at 556-57.
134. Id.
135. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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the use or benefit of another person's property."' 36 This anal-
ysis also suggests that treaty agreements that "extinguish"
claims against foreign sovereigns, in which possession is not in
issue, constitute takings. 137
A modern test of liability for foreign takings was set forth
in the 1985 decision, Langenegger v. United States.' 38 The court
ruled that the United States would be liable if the plaintiff
could prove "direct and substantial" United States involve-
ment in the foreign taking.' 39 A finding of direct and substan-
tial involvement depends on the nature of the activity and the
level of benefit derived by the United States.' 41 While the
court held that "diplomatic persuasion" did not constitute suf-
ficient involvement, it did not specify activities that would sus-
tain a charge of liability. 4 '
C. Multiple-State Involvement in Takings of Property:
Two Recent Cases
The expropriation of alien property precipitates a state-to-
state conflict in which individuals must rely on their sovereign
government to bring their claims and obtain relief.' 42 In addi-
tion, United States citizens have a constitutional right to com-
pensation when their property is taken by their own govern-
ment. 41 Until recently, claims against the United States for
foreign takings arose in a wartime context.' 44 Such precedent
is ill-equipped to resolve cases of foreign takings that occur in
peacetime. The Ramirez and Langenegger decisions represent a
new phase in United States domestic law in which the courts
have struggled to define the scope of United States liability for
136. Aris Gloves v. United States, 420 F.2d 1386, 1391 (Ct. CI. 1970); see also
Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
78 (1985).
137. But see Shanghai Power Co. v. U.S., 4 Ct. Cl. 237 (1983), aff'd, 765 F.2d 159
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 279 (1985).
138. 756 F.2d 1565; see infra notes 169-185 for a more detailed discussion of this
case.
139. Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1571-72.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1572.
142. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Aris Gloves v. United States, 420 F.2d 1386, (Ct. CI. 1970); Anglo
Chinese Shipping Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp 553 (Ct. CI. 1955); Gray v.
United States, 21 Ct. CI. 340 (1886).
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taking its citizens' property located in friendly nations in
peacetime circumstances. 45 This task is complicated by both
the changing standards of constitutional liability and the un-
certainty of the international law of state responsibility and ex-
propriations. It is likely that the uncertainties of international
law will cause United States claimants to assert United States
liability whenever possible. For this reason, the cases dis-
cussed below are of significant import, both in the interna-
tional and domestic legal context.
1. Ramirez v. Weinberger
Ramirez, a United States citizen, owned a multi-million
dollar cattle ranch and meat-packing company on a 14,000
acre tract of land in Honduras. In early 1983, the United
States Department of Defense selected Ramirez's land without
his knowledge as the site for a Regional Military Training
Center (Training Center) to train soldiers from El Salvador. 46
Several months later, the Honduran Government released an
official statement acknowledging the establishment of the
Training Center and the presence of foreign military advisers.
After Ramirez had brought suit in a United States court seek-
ing to enjoin the United States from using his property, Hon-
duras officially requested expropriation of Ramirez's land for
the Training Center. 147 However, the Honduran Government
neither ratified the request, as required by official procedure,
nor offered compensation. 48 Soon after the Training Center
was completed, soldiers began military manuevers, which
caused Ramirez's business to cease operating. 49 Neither the
Honduran nor the United States Governments indicated that
compensation would be forthcoming. 50
145. See Ramirez v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacatedsub nor.
Weinberger v. Ramirez, 105 S. Ct. 2353 (1985), on remand 788 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 78 (1985).
146. 745 F.2d at 1507-08. Ramirez was never informed of the decision to use
his land as a Military Training Center. The Army Corp of Engineers simply came
upon his land with work crews and began construction. The United States Embassy
in Honduras and the State and Defense Departments in Washington, D.C. refused to
see him. Id.
147. Id. at 1509, 1535.
148. Id. at 1535.
149. Id. at 1507.
150. Id. at 1508-09, 1535.
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Ramirez sued the United States, claiming that it was re-
sponsible for taking his property and that, in the absence of
formal expropriation and adequate compensation, the act vio-
lated the United States Constitution.' 5' The Government
sought to bar the case at the outset on grounds of nonjusticia-
bility, arguing that the political question doctrine barred judi-
cial review because the case required scrutiny of sensitive for-
eign policy matters, an area in which the courts should defer to
the discretion of the executive branch. 152 The district court
dismissed the case under the political question doctrine. 153
The District of Columbia Circuit reversed, stating that the case
only required the court to interpret the Constitution, not to
pass judgment on the President's foreign policy. 154
On appeal to the Circuit Court, the United States Govern-
ment raised a second defense, namely, that the act of state doc-
trine barred review because the Training Center project was an
act of the Honduran Government. 15 5 The District of Columbia
Circuit rejected the act of state argument because the plain-
tiff's claim did not require the court to sit in judgment on the
activities of the Honduran government with regard to the
seizure of the property. 56 Moreover, the Honduran Govern-
ment's expropriation decree did not constitute a completed
expropriation and, in the absence of conclusive foreign official
action, there was no act of state. 157 Furthermore, even a "lim-
ited degree of complicity by Honduran military officials" with
the United States would not absolve the United States of liabil-
ity for its own constitutional violations.' 58
The final blow to the act of state defense was the court's
151. Id. at 1525 n.102, 1529.
152. 568 F. Supp. at 1238.
153. Id. at 1238-40.
154. 745 F.2d at 1512-13. Moreover, the court ruled that the political question
doctrine did not exclude from judicial review anything done by United States officials
to their citizens on foreign soil. Id. at 1515. This views corresponds with the long-
standing principle that the United States government must act within constitutional
bounds towards its citizens both at home and abroad. See supra note 99 and accompa-
nying text.
155. 745 F.2d at 1509.
156. Id. at 1542 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897)).
157. Id. at 1534-35.
158. Id. at 1530.
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interpretation of the Hickenlooper Amendment.' 59 The court
reasoned that, if the expropriation was an act of the Honduran
Government, Honduras had violated international law by not
providing compensation. Under such circumstances, the Hick-
enlooper Amendment would allow judicial review of Ramirez's
claim, notwithstanding the act of state doctrine, and the United
States would have to suspend military and financial assistance
to Honduras. 60 Rather than find that the United States had
willingly violated the Hickenlooper Amendment by continuing
aid to Honduras, the court reasoned that the United States
must realize that Honduras had not seized the property in
question.1 6  Thus, Honduras had not violated international
law and the United States would not have to suspend aid to
Honduras. 162
The three dissenting opinions in Ramirez objected to the
attribution of responsibility to the United States for the sover-
eign act of another, independent State. 163  One dissenting
judge considered Honduras' expropriation decree as evidence
of an act of state even though the expropriation procedure re-
quired more than just the decree. ' 64 Finding the United States
wholly responsible for the Training Center was a "flagrant af-
front to the sovereignty of Honduras," and implied that the
United States unduly influenced the government of another
nation.' 65 This dissent distinguished Ramirez from the hostile
expropriations that prompted passage of the Hickenlooper
Amendment. 66 In addition, the Hickenlooper Amendment
provided for presidential waiver when national security inter-
ests were at stake. 167 Furthermore, before Ramirez, courts had
159. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(l)-(2) (1982). See supra notes 105-117 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of the Hickenlooper Amendment.
160. 745 F.2d at 1541. See also 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982). Unlike previous
cases involving the Hickenlooper Amendment, see supra note 112, the Ramire- major-
ity did not consider the location of the expropriated property as relevant to whether
the Hickenlooper Amendment was applicable. This approach strictly construes the
statutory language, while ignoring legislative history and legal precedent.
161. 745 F.2d at 1539.
162. Id.
163. See 745 F.2d at 1545-1550 (Tamm, C.J., dissenting), 1550-1566 (Scalia, J.,
BorkJ., and StarrJ., dissenting), and 1566-1574 (Starr, J. and Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 1568-69 (Starr, J., and Scalia, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 1572 (Starr, J., and ScaliaJ., dissenting).
166. Id. at 1573 (Starr, J., and ScaliaJ., dissenting).
167. Id. at 1573 n.9.
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invoked the Hickenlooper Amendment only when claimants'
property was within United States jurisdiction at the time of
suit.168
2. Langenegger v. United States
Langenegger, a United States citizen, owned a coffee plan-
tation in El Salvador.' 69 In 1980, the El Salvadoran Govern-
ment instituted an agrarian reform program which permitted
the Government to expropriate all privately held land of over
1235 acres.' 70 All affected landowners received long-term Sal-
vadoran bonds as compensation.' 7' These non-negotiable
bonds were, however, not equivalent to the value of the land
and were essentially worthless. 172
Langenegger sued the United States Government, charg-
ing it with responsibility for the loss of his property. 173 Specifi-
cally, he argued that the expropriation was a result of United
States coercion because United States military and financial
support to El Salvador was conditioned on adoption of an
agrarian reform program as well as various other reforms. 74
168. Id. at 1573-74. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court in October
1984. Later that month, while certiorari was pending, the United States Congress
passed a specific bill to halt funds for the RMTC until the Honduran government
"provided a site," ".assumed responsibility for any competing claims" to the land and
"recognizes the need to compensate as required by international law the United
States citizen who claims injury from the establishment and operation of the existing
Center.. " Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1894, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. Oct. 12, 1984.
The Supreme Court thereafter vacated the decision in light of this bill, without issu-
ing an opinion as to the soundness of the D.C. Circuit's reasoning. See 105 S. Ct.
2353.
169. See Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 78 (1985).
170. Id. The expropriated properties were converted into cooperatives run by
those who previously worked the estates. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Pub. L. No. 99-83, 99 Stat. 237, at 983-985, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 158, which appropriated $79.6 million to El Salvador for fiscal
year 1986-87, and in which Congress stated as one of its "expectations": "The Gov-
ernment of El Salvador will make demonstrated progress . . . in implementing the
land reform program." Id.
The effectiveness of the alleged coercion stemmed from the fact that the United
States backed Duarte when he was a revolutionary trying to gain control over the El
Salvadoran government. Duarte depended on continued United States support in
order to stay in power. Backing Duarte furthered United States interests in fending
off a Marxist revolution, thus fostering political stability.
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At the very least, the agrarian reform program was a joint ven-
ture between El Salvador and the United States, and the latter
was responsible to its own citizens for its part in causing them
injuries. 175
The United States Court of Claims granted summary
judgment in favor of the United States, 176 finding the case non-
justiciable due to the sensitive political and foreign policy
questions involved, 77 and citing the lack of fifth amendment
liability.17 8 However, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit disagreed with the Court of Claims on both the political
question and fifth amendment analyses. 179  Ascertaining re-
sponsibility and compensation for eminent domain claims is a
judicial function, the court held, even if the taking occurs
abroad or involves foreign policy matters.'80 The court need
not inquire into El Salvador's motives, but only consider
whether United States involvement was substantial enough to
warrant liability under the fifth amendment.'
The Federal Circuit further held that fifth amendment lia-
bility exists even if the United States action is not the "final
direct cause" of the property loss, and even if the property is
not taken for use by the United States Government. 8 2 The
court reasoned that the government has effectuated a taking if
it either deprives the owner of his interest in the property or
175. See Langenegger v. United States, 5 Ct. CI. at 232-33 (1984).
176. Id. at 237.
177. See Id. at 233-36. The court rejected the allegation of undue influence on
Salvadoran affairs because such a charge suggested that the two nations "dealt not as
sovereign equals, but as master and servant." Id. at 235. In addition, the court re-
fused to review the validity of a foreign act of state. Id. at 234 n.5.
178. Id. at 231-32. The court relied on Anglo Chinese Shipping Co. v. United
States, 127 F.Supp. 553 (Ct. Cl. 1955), in which the United States was not held liable
for a taking of property which it had ordered, because it was forJapan's benefit. The
Langenegger court reasoned that, since the United States did not "directly" benefit
from the El Salvadoran agrarian reform program, it did not incur fifth amendment
liability. In addition, the joint venture theory was rejected because it was heretofore
used mainly to redress violations of criminal rights protected by the fifth amendment,
not property rights. Id. at 232-33.
179. 756 F.2d at 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
180. Id. at 1569.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1570. The Court of Appeals thus rejected the Claims Court's reliance
on Anglo Chinese Shipping Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 553 (Ct. Cl. 1955),
updating it with the approach taken in more recent fifth amendment cases. See supra
notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
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enables another party to obtain the use or benefit of the prop-
erty.'8 3 The test for determining liability consists of two fac-
tors: the nature of involvement and the benefit obtained by
the United States. 8
4
The circuit court ultimately ruled that the facts in
Langenegger did not support fifth amendment liability. "Diplo-
matic persuasion" did not constitute sufficient involvement,
and "hemispheric stability" was not a sufficient benefit to hold
the United States responsible for Langenegger's loss of prop-
erty under the agrarian reform program. 85
Although the Langenegger decision did not address the ap-
plicability of the Hickenlooper Amendment to claims involving
expropriated property remaining in foreign jurisdictions, the
same question raised by the District of Columbia Circuit in Ra-
mirez also arises in Langenegger. Given that the United States
Government's defense in Langenegger is that the uncompen-
sated expropriation of the coffee plantation was an act of state
by the El Salvadoran Government, the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment would require the United States Government to suspend
further assistance to El Salvador.' 86 However, finding the
United States responsible for the taking not only obligates the
United States government to compensate, but also is an admis-
sion of control over El Salvadoran internal affairs."t 7 More-
over, use of a Presidential waiver of the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment in this case, as the Ramirez dissents advocate, undercuts
an essential purpose of the provision, which is to safeguard
United States investments abroad.' 8 8 Foreign investments are
most vulnerable to expropriation in periods of political unrest
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1570-71.
185. Id. at 1572. Langenegger's claim was dismissed without prejudice to a
showing that he could not satisfy his claim through international arbitration. Id. at
1573. El Salvador had agreed to abide by the Carribbean Basin Economic Recovery
Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, Title II, 97 Stat. 384 (1983), whereby disputes would be
settled by international arbitration. However, Langenegger was free to reassert his
claim in a United States court if' resort to arbitration was unavailing. 756 F.2d at
1573. It is possible that, if the arbitration offered compensation at a standard below
that required by the United States, the claim could be heard in a United States court
under the Hickenlooper Amendment.
186. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of interven-
tion into territorial sovereignty.
188. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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in unstable and developing countries such as El Salvador.
Presidential waiver in such situations would be a back-door
method of dealing with the problem, and does not speak well
of the Amendment's enforceability when put to the test.
III. SETTING THE STANDARD: WHEN IS THE UNITED
STA TES RESPONSIBLE TO ITS CITIZENS FOR
FOREIGN PROPERTY LOSS?
The two major questions presented by Ramirez and
Langenegger are: 1) whether the act of state doctrine is waived
under the Hickenlooper Amendment in cases in which the ex-
propriated property remains in a foreign jurisdiction, and 2)
whether the United States will incur responsibility to its citi-
zens when its involvement in the internal affairs of another
country causes loss of their property.
A. Reappraising The Scope of the Hickenlooper Amendment
The Hickenlooper Amendment was enacted to reverse the
holding of Sabbatino, in which the Supreme Court refused to
review a claim by a United States citizen against the Cuban
government for expropriating his property.' 89 This exception
to the act of state doctrine is best understood in the context of
its creation, that is, as a reaction to the belligerant act of a hos-
tile state, which had discriminatorily expropriated the property
of United States citizens.' 90
The Hickenlooper Amendment was received with some
apprehension about the far-reaching effects of opening the
courts to claims against foreign sovereigns.' 9 ' The bill's pro-
ponents assured that it was to be a narrow exception, limited
to the rare cases in which there was property in United States
jurisdiction that was traceable to the property expropriated
abroad.192 Jurisdiction over the res provided some justification
for hearing the claim.' 9 3 Curiously, however, the statute itself
fails to require that the property be within United States juris-
189. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 431 F.2d 394, 400 (2d Cir. 1970).
190. Id.
191. See First Natl, 431 F.2d at 400-02.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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diction as a predicate for invoking the Amendment. 194 The
statute merely requires a foreign expropriation contrary to in-
ternational law, that is, one that is discriminatory or inade-
quately compensated. 1 9 5
The Ramirez court held that Congress would have included
in the Amendment a limitation on the location of the expropri-
ated property at the time of suit if it had contemplated such a
requirement.' 9 6 Because the Amendment did not contain this
limitation, the court found it applicable to any foreign expro-
priation that violated international law, regardless of the situs
of the property.197 Such an interpretation clearly contradicts
legislative intent.'1 It also could put the President in the unde-
sirable position of suspending aid to a friendly nation that
committed an isolated act of expropriation or, as in Ramirez
and Langenegger, actually complied with United States wishes
by taking the property in question.
If a United States citizen sues the United States Govern-
ment for taking property which was located in foreign terri-
tory, the foreign sovereign is not hauled into court, so the act
of state doctrine is not in issue. Assertion of the act of state
doctrine as a defense merely clouds the legal issues and should
be dismissed as irrelevant. It is unnecessary to invoke the
Hickenlooper Amendment in order to rebut an act of state de-
fense by the United States Government. A court can discern
whether the United States was responsible for the taking with-
out scrutinizing the conduct of the territorial sovereign. 199
The Hickenlooper Amendment need not be broadened
beyond legislative intent in order to enable United States citi-
zens to obtain relief from their own government. The solution
is simply to acknowledge United States responsibility for its ac-
tions in foreign territory. This is not to suggest, of course, that
the territorial sovereign is never liable. What is needed is to
establish a standard for determining when the United States
194. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1)-(2) (1982).
195. Id.
196. Ramirez v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1541-42 n.180 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
vacated sub nom. Weinberger v. Ramirez, 105 S. Ct. 2353 (1985), on remand 788 F.2d
143 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
197. Id.
198. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 78 (1985).
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should be held liable, taking into account both domestic and
international legal principles.
B. United States Involvement in Foreign Nations As a Basis of
Responsibility for Property Loss
In both Langenegger and Ramirez, the United States sought
to avoid liability by placing responsibility on El Salvador and
Honduras, respectively, for the events occurring in those juris-
dictions, ostensibly because the nations maintained sovereign
control over their territories. 200  The United States Govern-
ment argued that the expropriations were foreign acts of state,
the validity of which could not be determined by United States
courts. 20 ' This position defies the tenets of the international
law of state responsibility promulgated by the ILC,2 ° 2 and pro-
vides a convenient, if unseemly, way of shielding the United
States Government from its own citizens whenever it acts in a
foreign jurisdiction. Moreover, this position encourages co-
vert involvement in the affairs of other nations, because the
United States Government may shift responsibility to the terri-
torial sovereign whenever injuries occur in a foreign jurisdic-
tion. While the United States should not shoulder the burden
of reparations each time that it influences a nation to act one
way or another, neither should it be categorically exculpated of
liability for property loss when it acts in concert with a foreign
203sovereign.
Article 12 of the ILC's draft articles provides that the terri-
200. See supra notes 155, 177 and accompanying text.
201. Id.
202. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text. The ILC Draft Articles on
State Responsibility recognize a number of circumstances in which a state will not be
liable for events occurring in its jurisdiction. See supra notes 60-61; Corfu Channel
Case (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9) (rejecting a strict territorial test
of liability).
203. Following the pattern set by the post-World War II cases, see supra notes
130-34 and accompanying text, most claims against the United States seeking com-
pensation for takings of property abroad have not been successful.
A limited degree of success has been achieved in the area of criminal rights viola-
tions by United States officials acting through or with foreign officials. See, e.g., Berlin
Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (United States
held liable for illegal electronic surveillance of its citizens' activities in West Germany
on the grounds that "the fourth amendment does apply to actions by foreign officials
if United States officials participated in those actions so as to convert them into joint
ventures"). But see United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 23-30 (lst Cir.), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 958 (1983) (illegal search of Honduran ship by Canadian officials at United
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torial sovereign will not be responsible for the conduct of or-
gans of foreign states acting on behalf of their own govern-
ment. °4 If the organs are placed at the disposal of the territo-
rial sovereign, however, it will be responsible." 5 If the Ramirez
court had applied an Article 12 analysis to the facts of the case,
it could not find Honduras responsible for the taking of the
ranch by United States officials because they were acting on
behalf of their own government, not Honduras. °6 The United
States officials set up the training center for use by El Salvado-
ran soldiers, not Honduras, and the Army Corp of Engineers,
which presided over the taking of Ramirez's land, was not
under the control of the Honduran Government.20 7
From Honduras' perspective, the case for non-liability
would seem stronger because the party injured by the taking
was a national of that state. Not only did the United States
construct the Training Center for its own purposes, but it took
land from one of its own citizens to do so. But for the fact that
the chain of events occurred in a foreign jurisdiction, the dis-
pute is really one between the United States Government and
its citizen.20 8 The majority of the Ramirez court so viewed the
situation, 209 but the United States Government never accepted
responsibility, and mooted the case by suspending funding for
the project before adjudication by the Supreme Court. l0
Similarly, if international legal principles of state responsi-
States' request was a "joint venture" which violated Honduras' rights under interna-
tional law, not the individual's rights under the fourth amendment).
The United States Court of Claims in Langenegger explicitly rejected expansion of
the joint venture theory to cases of violations of foreign property rights under the
fifth amendment. See 5 Ct. Cl. 229, 232 (1984).
204. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
205. Id.
206. See Ramirez v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1507 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated
sub noma. Weinberger v. Ramirez, 105 S.Ct. 2353, (1985), on remand 788 F.2d 143
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
207. Id.
208. One wonders whether the Honduran Government would have wanted to
become involved in the dispute at all, which it could have regarded as a matter of
United States sovereign discretion in the treatment of its own nationals. See supra
note 43 and accompanying text.
209. Ramirez, 745 F.2d at 1529.
210. See supra note 168. The United States withdrawal from the situation was
less than graceful, however. The bill did not disclaim liability outright, but instead
called on Honduras to settle claims to title, clearly intending to sidestep the whole
issue of responsibility. Id.
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bility were applied to the Langenegger case, El Salvador would
not be responsible for injuries resulting from the agrarian re-
form program on the grounds of external coercion or con-
trol.2 1' Article 28 of the ILC draft articles provides that a state
will not be liable for its action if it resulted from coercion by
another state, or if it was subject to the control of another state
in the field of activity of the act. 21 2 Thus, even though no or-
gans of the United States Government were present in El Sal-
vador as in the Ramirez case, and even though the agrarian re-
form program was instituted by El Salvadoran officials, the ele-
ment of external coercion-political pressure by the United
States-precludes El Salvadoran liability.2 '3
Taken alone, mere advice by the United States to El Salva-
dor, suggesting agrarian reform, would not be coercive and no
liability should ensue for acts by El Salvador subsequent to
such advice. However, when financial and military support on
which the nation depends is conditioned upon compliance with
the advice, the picture radically changes. In such cases, the
foreign sovereign, here, El Salvador, is effectively carrying out
the will of the United States. When United States citizens are
injured at the will of their own government, they are entitled to
some remedy.21 4 It is unrealistic to expect reparation from the
foreign sovereign for injuries to United States nationals when
it is following the directives of the United States. When na-
tionals of one state are injured by a foreign sovereign, their
claim for redress is brought by their own government in a
state-to-state confrontation.21 5 It would be inconsistent for the
United States to demand compliance with the conditions of its
assistance and, at the same time, assume an adversarial posture
to seek reparations on behalf of its citizens for injuries result-
ing from such compliance. Under such circumstances, seeking
211. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
212. Id.
213. See Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S.Ct. 78 (1985). See also supra note 60. Domination by foreign nations in
certain areas is a common occurrence in international politics, see Joyner, supra note
42, and does not ordinarily diminish the subjected nation's status of sovereignty. See
supra note 40 and accompanying text. Theoretical sovereignty notwithstanding, the
prevailing views of state responsibility law exculpate states of liability under these
circumstances. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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reparations would clearly be an abuse of diplomatic protec-
tion. 6 As Langenegger illustrates, the foreign sovereign would
be doubly disadvantaged: first, in complying with conditions
set by another government, and second, in offering a standard
of treatment for foreign nationals that is superior to what it
offers its own citizens. 217
A corollary issue is the legality of United States involve-
ment in the foreign jurisdiction. If Honduras and El Salvador
are not liable for injuries to aliens in their jurisdiction because
of intervening acts by the United States, the latter may be lia-
ble to those nations for unwanted encroachment on their terri-
tories. 2 18 International law condemns intervention as a viola-
tion of sovereignty.2 t9 Unless the sovereign granted territorial
privileges, or, invited the involvement of the foreign sovereign,
the acts would be unlawful.2 2 Consent cannot be presumed
merely because the intervention was successful. 22' The ILC
draft articles accordingly relieve the state of responsibility for
acts committed under coercion, and even shift responsibility to
the intervening state.222 If this approach does not entirely dis-
courage intervention, it would at least penalize its practice.
Even if Honduras and El Salvador were responsible for ex-
propriating the properties without giving adequate compensa-
tion, the question remains whether they would be found in
breach of international law. 2 3 The United States would clearly
view an inadequately compensated expropriation as illegal
216. See note 49 and accompanying text. Latin American nations in particular
have vehemently objected to the oppressive use of diplomatic protection. Id.
217. See Guha-Roy, supra note 50.
218. See supra notes 29-31, 38 and accompanying text.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 51. A state is not responsible for its own
acts when they were undertaken in response to foreign intervention or coercion. Id.
art. 28. To say that the establishment of the RMTC on Honduran soil, or the adop-
tion of an agrarian reform program by El Salvador must have been preceded by the
consent of the sovereign simply because it occurred is to ignore the realities of mod-
ern international politics. The United Nations recognizes that weaker sovereign
states may succumb to the will of the stronger; resistance is not required to show that
intervention has occurred. Id.; see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 61. Since the United States publicly recognizes the sover-
eignty of El Salvador and Honduras, its conduct on their territory, without their per-
mission, would constitute intervention. See 1979 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE
IN INT'L LAW at 127-282.
223. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
1986]
56 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 10:22
under international law.224 However, many international legal
scholars dispute the notion of a duty to compensate for expro-
priations.2 25 Most nations have rejected the classic standard of
"prompt, adequate and effective" compensation, and have left
the question of compensation to the discretion of individual
states.22 6 Since the failure to compensate is not unlawful,
there is no claim against the taking state. z2 7 Thus, under pre-
vailing tenets of international law, Honduras and El Salvador
would not be liable for the claims of Ramirez and Langeneg-
ger, either by virtue of intervening acts that preclude responsi-
bility,228 or by the absence of a duty to compensate aliens for
expropriated property. 229
If international law fails to provide adequate safeguards
for alien property rights, United States domestic law should fill
the void, at least in the limited number of cases in which in-
volvement in the foreign territory plausibly leads to United
States responsibility. A number of policy considerations justify
this position. First, the foreign government may legitimately
disclaim liability under the principles of state responsibility
law, due to external acts or control,23 ° leaving the individual
without legal remedy under international law. Second, it
would be inconsistent to demand reparations from the foreign
sovereign for loss of alien property when the individual's own
government shares blame for the loss. Third, an embarrassing
dispute over compensation could be avoided. 23 ' Finally, the
matter need not be referred to an international forum, which
would be likely to focus negatively on the element of unlawful
intervention by the United States.
It is possible that assuming responsibility for a wider
range of foreign takings might encourage meritless claims
when United States involvement in foreign states is tenuous.
224. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, § 712 (Tent. Draft No. 7 1986); Hick-
enlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1982).
225. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. That is, if the United States
insisted on the "prompt, adequate and effective" standard, while the other nation
claims it is not obligated under international law to compensate at all.
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In addition, adjudication of these claims vests the courts with
authority over delicate foreign policy questions, and the finan-
cial burden of compensating such expropriations may be great.
However, the burden is unavoidable if the United States is to
honor its constitutional obligation to act lawfully toward its cit-
izens, even outside its territory, and to compensate them for
property loss for which it is responsible.
CONCLUSION
In the Langenegger and Ramirez cases, the courts acknowl-
edged the possibility of United States responsibility to its citi-
zens for takings of property occurring in foreign jurisdic-
tions.232 This is consistent with domestic law, which makes the
government liable for constitutional violations both at home
and abroad.2 3 It is also consistent with international legal
principles of state responsibility which would impute liability
to a state other than the territorial sovereign if the other state
intervened.234
The Langenegger court determined that United States in-
volvement in that case was insufficient to warrant liability
under domestic law. In contrast, the Ramirez court found
United States liability but stretched the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment beyond legislative intent in an attempt to sidestep the act
of state doctrine. While focusing on the domestic legal ques-
tions presented by the cases, the courts largely ignored the in-
ternational scope of the conflicts. Under the international law
of state responsibility, Honduras and El Salvador would be re-
lieved of liability. 235 In addition, the conduct of the United
States would constitute unlawful intervention.3 6
Claims of United States citizens regarding the expropria-
tion of property in foreign territory for which the United States
may share responsibility should be brought in a United States
forum. If the claim is brought in an international forum, the
injured individual would likely have no remedy under interna-
tional law,237 and the United States could be declared guilty of
232. See supra notes 156-58, 180-81 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
235. Id.
236. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
237. That is, because the expropriating state has no duty to compensate, see
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unlawful intervention in the foreign nation. By assuming re-
sponsibility for property loss suffered by its citizens as a result
of its involvement in a foreign nation, the United States would
fulfill its duty to act fairly toward its citizens, ensure that its
nationals are compensated for injuries suffered abroad, and
save itself the embarassment of adjudication by potentially
hostile international forums.
Miriam A. Kadragich *
supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text, and because current state responsibility
law exculpates states of liability when coercion or intervention by another state has
occurred. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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